


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15 November 1963

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

15 November 1963

### DAILY BRIEF

USSR-Berlin: (The Soviet ambassador in Bonn reportedly said that the recent autobahn incidents were designed to persuade the Western governments that "early negotiations on access routes to West Berlin are necessary.")

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[redacted] Ambassador Smirnov indicated that there would be further incidents aimed at reminding the Western powers that the question of East German (GDR) recognition "has to be resolved in some form."

(He stated that Soviet military authorities in the GDR have orders not to allow themselves to be provoked and to avoid use of firearms. Smirnov also hinted that Moscow intends to manipulate these incidents to gain Western acceptance of East Germany's "sovereign rights.")

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(East German propaganda on the incidents has claimed that the West has no legal right to use the autobahn. The East German first deputy premier asserted on 14 November that the access routes "come under the jurisdiction" of East Germany. He added that the GDR has "temporarily transferred" the control of Allied traffic to the USSR.)

(Since mid-August, Soviet diplomats have hinted [redacted] that the USSR may be prepared to negotiate new access arrangements with the Allied governments.)

(Gromyko recently indicated that the Soviet Government would issue a formal statement on the whole question of access. A new Soviet dé-marche may revive the proposal Moscow made last year for the establishment of an international access authority.)

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USSR - Somali Republic: (The recently signed Soviet - Somali Republic military aid agreement apparently is a standard Soviet program aimed at long-term military cooperation but tailored to Mogadiscio's precarious financial situation.)

([redacted] materiel will begin to arrive next February. It will include [redacted] MIG-17 jet fighters, a few transport aircraft, five coastal patrol ships, T-34 tanks, armored cars, a large amount of artillery, transport equipment, and repair facilities.)

(The program is aimed at equipping an armed force of about 10,000 men. More than 200 Somali personnel are now training in the USSR.)

(Nearly \$28 million of the aid--apparently about two thirds of the total--will be furnished as an outright Soviet grant. The remainder will be covered by long-term credits with repayments in hard currency.)

(A large number of Soviet advisers and technicians will be needed to help the Somalis assimilate this materiel, and the agreement provides for the establishment of a Soviet military aid mission in the country. The Soviets rejected Mogadiscio's plan for using Egyptian personnel for this purpose.)

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**\*South Vietnam:** Viet Cong guerrillas have continued widespread aggressive activity at record high levels through the second consecutive week since the coup. Some 1,021 incidents, including more than 200 small-scale attacks--more than twice the normal weekly figures--were recorded during the period 5-11 November.

Government military forces, preparing their own form of intensified operations, warned the inhabitants of four Communist-dominated hamlets north of Saigon to evacuate their homes in advance of a planned aerial bombardment of underground Viet Cong installations.

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\*Iraq: The apparent victory of the moderate faction of the Iraqi Baath Party has quickly come unstuck in the face of continued opposition from extremist elements backing ousted party strong man Saadi.

At the moment neither side has clear control and further intraparty jockeying can be expected.

Armed resistance on the part of the Saadi supporters was easily contained on 13 November, but the continued refusal of members of the national guard--the party's paramilitary wing--and of middle and lower party echelons to accede to his ouster and exile led to an impasse. Premier Bakr and Defense Minister Ammash, who appear to have taken a neutral position in this second phase of the struggle, convoked a meeting in Baghdad of the international leadership of the Baath in an effort to resolve the dispute.

The international leadership apparently decided that party discipline in Iraq could be restored only by voiding the 11 November election of a slate of moderates to top Iraqi party posts, reading the moderate leaders out of the party, and exiling them. This action was taken, but the solution is unlikely to be final.

Saadi, now in Spain, retains strong support among the party rank and file and has announced his intention to leave today for Damascus en route to Baghdad. Ammash, who has played a fairly independent role throughout the struggle and who has close ties to party cells within the military, appears to be the greatest gainer from the latest party shifts.

Preoccupation with these party matters will weaken the regime's hold on the machinery of government and on internal security.

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Burma: (Coup talk is becoming increasingly specific as dissatisfaction with the Ne Win regime continues to mount.)

(Opposition elements intend to take the first step between 15 and 18 November in a long-term plan to bring down the government. [redacted])

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[redacted] They are planning a "catalytic incident," possibly involving the Buddhist clergy or student groups, aimed at coalescing elements which are hostile to the regime.)

(Opposition leaders intend this incident to occur before the government can conclude an agreement with a coalition of Communist insurgent groups.)

General Ne Win, fearing an uprising, has cracked down hard on the political opposition parties but criticism of the regime continues.

While he apparently retains the basic loyalty of the military, he has also felt it necessary to remove officers who have connections with civilian oppositionists. As long as his military support does not erode, any attempt to overturn Ne Win would require a prolonged build-up of popular dissatisfactions.

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NOTES

Communist China - Mexico: (The Chinese Communists are sending the highest ranking official ever to visit Latin America--except for Cuba--to open their trade fair in Mexico next month. The delegation will be headed by Kuo Mo-jo, Peiping's leading cultural propaganda specialist, who has represented China at large international front group meetings. Peiping probably regards the exhibition--its first real effort in Mexico--as a good opportunity to expand contacts and press for permanent trade and press representation.)

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British Guiana: (The People's Progressive Party (PPP) has scheduled a number of mass rallies on 17 November to protest London's requirement for pre-independence elections under a proportional representation system--which the PPP believes was designed to oust Jagan. The party is also trying to organize boycotts of all British and American products and social functions. In addition, the PPP is seeking to pack the civil service by filling all vacancies with East Indians.)

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